메뉴 건너뛰기
International Journal of Game Theory
Volumn 32, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 241-251
Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
Author keywords

Direct mechanism; Stable matching; Strong equilibrium; Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
Indexed keywords

EID: 0346307558     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820300156     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (18)
References (15)
  • 1
    • 0030115735 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
    • Alcalde J (1996) Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems, Journal of Economic Theory 69: 240-254
    • (1996) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.69 , pp. 240-254
    • Alcalde, J.1
  • 2
    • 0008924966 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
    • Alcalde J, Romero-Medina A (2000) Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems, Games and Economic Behavior 31(2): 294-302
    • (2000) Games and Economic Behavior , vol.31 , Issue.2 , pp. 294-302
    • Alcalde, J.1    Romero-Medina, A.2
  • 3
    • 0003165311 scopus 로고
    • College admissions and the stability of marriage
    • Gale D, Shapley L (1962) College admissions and the stability of marriage, American Mathematical Monthly 69: 9-15
    • (1962) American Mathematical Monthly , vol.69 , pp. 9-15
    • Gale, D.1    Shapley, L.2
  • 4
  • 5
    • 0000285848 scopus 로고
    • Ms. Machiavelli and the stable matching problem
    • Gale D, Sotomayor M (1985b) Ms. Machiavelli and the stable matching problem, American Mathematical Monthly 92: 261-268
    • (1985) American Mathematical Monthly , vol.92 , pp. 261-268
    • Gale, D.1    Sotomayor, M.2
  • 6
  • 8
    • 0001035215 scopus 로고
    • Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
    • Ma J (1995) Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market, Journal of Economic Theory 66: 352-369
    • (1995) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.66 , pp. 352-369
    • Ma, J.1
  • 11
    • 0000763623 scopus 로고
    • Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
    • Perez-Castrillo D (1984) Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem, Journal of Economic Theory 34: 383-387
    • (1984) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.34 , pp. 383-387
    • Perez-Castrillo, D.1
  • 12
    • 0003335830 scopus 로고
    • Two-sided matching. A study in game theoretic modeling and analysis
    • Cambridge University Press
    • Roth AE, Sotomayor M (1990) Two-sided matching. A study in game theoretic modeling and analysis, Econometric Society Monographs n. 18, Cambridge University Press
    • (1990) Econometric Society Monographs , vol.18
    • Roth, A.E.1    Sotomayor, M.2
  • 13
    • 0002996856 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Truncation strategies in matching markets- in search of advice for participants
    • Roth AE, Rothblum UG (1999) Truncation strategies in matching markets- in search of advice for participants, Econometrica 67: 21-43
    • (1999) Econometrica , vol.67 , pp. 21-43
    • Roth, A.E.1    Rothblum, U.G.2
  • 14
    • 0030144273 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
    • Shin S, Suh S-C (1996) A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems, Economics Letters 51: 185-189
    • (1996) Economics Letters , vol.51 , pp. 185-189
    • Shin, S.1    Suh, S.-C.2
  • 15
    • 0031211851 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Games of manipulation in marriage problems
    • Sönmez T (1997) Games of manipulation in marriage problems, Games and Economic Behaviour 20: 169-176
    • (1997) Games and Economic Behaviour , vol.20 , pp. 169-176
    • Sönmez, T.1

* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.