Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market

Review of Economic Design

Volumn 3, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 137-147

  Romero Medina, Antonio ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Implementation; Matching markets

Indexed keywords

EID: 54649083245     PISSN: 14344742     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s100580050009     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. Aumann, R.J. (1959) Acceptable Points in General Cooperation n-Persons Games. In: Contributions to the Theory of Games IV. Princeton University Press, Princeton
2. Escudero, T. (1991) Acceso a la Universidad: Modelos Europeos, Vías Alternativas y Reformas en España. INFORMES 36, Instituto de Ciencias de la Educación, Universidad de Zaragoza
3. Gale, D., Shapley, Ll. (1962) College Admissions and Stability of Marriage. Amer. Math. Monthly 69: 9-15
4. Gusfield, D., Irving, R.W. (1989) The Stable Marriage Problem, Structure and Algorithms. The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts
5. Roth, A.E. (1984) Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching. Econometrica 52: 47-57
6. Roth, A.E. (1984) Misrepresentation and Stability in the Marriage Problem. J. Econ. Theory 34: 383-387
7. Roth, A.E. (1985) The college Admissions Problem is not Equivalent to the Marriage Problem. J. Econ. Theory 36: 277-288
8. Roth, A.E., Sotomayor, M. (1989) The College Admissions Problem Revised. Econometrica 57: 559-570
9. Roth, A.E., Sotomayor, M. (1990) Two-Sided Matching Markets: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. Econometric Society Monograph. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge