College admissions with affirmative action

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 33, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 535-549

  Abdulkadiroǧlu, Atila ^a  

^a Columbia University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 27644446925     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-005-0215-7     Document Type: Review

References (23)

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