Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 67, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 69-98

  Guo, Mingyu ^a   Conitzer, Vincent ^a  

^a Duke University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 67651238634     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.06.007     Document Type: Article

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