Derandomization of auctions

Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 619-625

  Aggarwal, Gagan ^a   Hartline, Jason D ^b   Fiat, Amos ^c   Immorlica, Nicole ^d   Goldberg, Andrew V ^b   Sudan, Madhu ^d  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

^c TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^d MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Derandomization; Mechanism design

Indexed keywords

AUCTIONS; DERANDOMIZATION; MECHANISM DESIGN; POLYNOMIAL-TIME;

APPROXIMATION THEORY; PROBLEM SOLVING; SOCIAL ASPECTS;

RANDOM PROCESSES;

EID: 34848835479     PISSN: 07378017     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1060590.1060682     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (13)

1. A. Archer and E. Tardos, Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents. In Proc. of the 42nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2001.
2. A. Blum and J. Hartline. Near-Optimal Online Auctions. In Proc. 16th Symp. on Discrete Alg. ACM/SIAM, 2005.
3. T. Ebert. Applications of recursive operators to randomness and complexity. PhD thesis, University of California at Santa Barbara, 1998.
4. U. Feige. You Can Leave Your Hat On (if you guess its color). Technical Report MCS04-03, Computer Science and Applied Mathematics, The Weizmann Institute of Science, 2004.
5. A. Fiat, A. Goldberg, J. Hartline, and A. Karliri. Competitive Generalized Auctions. In Proc. 34th ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing. ACM Press, New York, 2002.
6. A. Goldberg and J. Hartline. Competitiveness via Concensus. In Proc. 14th Symp. on Discrete Algorithms. ACM/SIAM, 2003.
7. A. Goldberg, J. Hartline, A. Karlin, M. Saks, and A. Wright. Competitive auctions and digital goods, Games and Economic Behavior, 2002. Submitted for publication. An earlier version available as InterTrust Technical Report STAR-TR-99.09.01.
8. A. Goldberg, J. Hartline, and A. Wright. Competitive Auctions and Digital Goods. In Proc. 12th Symp. on Discrete Algorithms, pages 735-744. ACM/SIAM, 2001.
9. D. Lehmarm, L. O'Callaghan, and Y. Shoham. Truth Revelation in Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions. In Proc. of 1st ACM Conf. on E-Commeive, pages 96-102. ACM Press, New York, 1999.
10. J. Mirrlees. An Exploration into the Theory of Optimal Income Taxation. Review of Economics Studies, 38:175-208, April 1971.
11. H. Moulin and S. Shenker. Strategyproof Sharing of Submodular Costs: Budget Balance vs. Efficiency. Economic Theory, 18:511-533, 2001.
12. I. Segal. Optimal Pricing Mechanism with Unknown Demand. American Economic Review, 93:509-29, 2003.
13. P. Winkler. Games People don't Play. In D. Wolfe and T. Rogers, editors, Puzzler's tribute. A feast for the mind. A K Peters, 2001.