Adaptive limited-supply online auctions

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn 5, Issue , 2004, Pages 71-80

  Hajiaghayi, Mohammad T ^a   Kleinberg, Robert ^a   Parkes, David C ^b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; ONLINE SYSTEMS; PROBLEM SOLVING; SOCIAL SCIENCES; THEOREM PROVING;

ONLINE AUCTIONS; SECRETARY ALGORITHMS; TIME-STRATEGYPROOF;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 3242749021     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/988772.988784     Document Type: Conference Paper

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