Gains from manipulating social choice rules

Economic Theory

Volumn 40, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 349-371

  Campbell, Donald E ^a   Kelly, Jerry S ^b  

^a The College of William and Mary   (United States)

^b SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Condorcet; Gain; Gibbard Satterthwaite; Manipulation; Scoring rules

Indexed keywords

EID: 67650935894     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-008-0380-6     Document Type: Article

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