SCOPUS 정보 검색 플랫폼

Volumn 16, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 639-661

Manipulability measures of common social choice functions

a NONE (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033445753 PISSN: 01761714 EISSN: None Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1007/s003550050166 Document Type: Article

Times cited : (42)

References (8)

1
- 0001195563
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Gibbard A (1973) Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result. Econometrica 41 (No. 4): 587-601
- (1973) Econometrica , vol.41 , Issue.4 , pp. 587-601
- Gibbard, A.¹

2
- 0038832454
- Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
- Kelly JS (1993) Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't. Soc Choice Welfare 10: 161-175
- (1993) Soc Choice Welfare , vol.10 , pp. 161-175
- Kelly, J.S.¹

3
- 34250115483
- Sophisticated Voting Outcomes and Agenda Control
- Banks JS (1985) Sophisticated Voting Outcomes and Agenda Control. Soc Choice Welfare 1: 295-306
- (1985) Soc Choice Welfare , vol.1 , pp. 295-306
- Banks, J.S.¹

4
- 0003397111
- McGraw-Hill, San Francisco
- Dixon WJ, Massey, Jr. FJ (1969) Introduction to Statistical Analysis. McGraw-Hill, San Francisco
- (1969) Introduction to Statistical Analysis
- Dixon, W.J.¹ Massey Jr., F.J.²

5
- 48349099781
- A new solution set for tournaments and majority voting: Further graph-theoretic approaches to the theory of voting
- Miller N (1980) A new solution set for tournaments and majority voting: further graph-theoretic approaches to the theory of voting. Amer J Polit Sci 24: 68-96
- (1980) Amer J Polit Sci , vol.24 , pp. 68-96
- Miller, N.¹

6
- 84903007957
- Yale University Press, New Haven
- Arrow KJ (1993) Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd edn. Yale University Press, New Haven
- (1993) Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd Edn.
- Arrow, K.J.¹

7
- 0004208301
- Routledge, Chapman and Hall, New York
- Ordeshook PC (1992) A Political Theory Primer. Routledge, Chapman and Hall, New York
- (1992) A Political Theory Primer
- Ordeshook, P.C.¹

8
- 49549141769
- Strategy Proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions
- Satterthwaite MA (1975) Strategy Proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions. J Econ Theory 10: 187-217
- (1975) J Econ Theory , vol.10 , pp. 187-217
- Satterthwaite, M.A.¹

* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.