SCOPUS 정보 검색 플랫폼

Volumn 49, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 103-116

Threshold strategy-proofness: On manipulability in large voting problems

Author keywords

Mean rule; Threshold strategy proofness; Voting problems

Indexed keywords

EID: 4344665059 PISSN: 08998256 EISSN: None Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.10.004 Document Type: Article

Times cited : (10)

References (12)

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