Minimal manipulability: Unanimity and nondictatorship

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 43, Issue 6, 2007, Pages 675-691

  Maus, Stefan ^a   Peters, Hans ^a   Storcken, Ton ^a  

^a MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Minimal manipulability; Nondictatorship; Social choice functions; Unanimity

Indexed keywords

EID: 34249081830     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.04.014     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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