Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation

Review of Economic Design

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 213-228

  Favardin, Pierre ^a   Lepelley, Dominique ^a   Serais, Jérôme ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE CAEN   (France)

Author keywords

Manipulability; Positional voting systems; Voting theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 1542696879     PISSN: 14344742     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s100580200073     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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