On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 263-277

  Pritchard, Geoffrey ^a   Slinko, Arkadii ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748579028     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0130-2     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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