Minimal manipulability: Anonymity and unanimity

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 29, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 247-269

  Maus, Stefan ^a   Peters, Hans ^a   Storcken, Ton ^a  

^a MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547441325     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0202-3     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. Aleskerov F, Kurbanov E (1999) Degree of manipulability of social choice procedures. In: Proceedings of the third international meeting of the society for the advancement of economic theory. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg New York
2. Fristrup P, Keiding H (1998) Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions. Soc Choice Welfare 15:455-467
3. Gibbard A (1973) Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result. Econometrica 41:587-602
4. Kelly JS (1988) Minimal manipulability and local strategy-proofness. Soc Choice Welfare 5:81-85
5. Maus S, Peters H, Storcken A (2004a) Minimal manipulability: Anonymity and Surjectivity. J Math Econ (forthcoming)
6. Maus S, Peters H, Storcken A (2004b) Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship. Research Memorandum Universiteit Maastricht RM /04/006, University of Maastricht
7. Maus S, Peters H, Storcken A (2005) Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability. J Econ Theory (forthcoming)
8. May KO (1952) A set of independent, necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority voting. Econometrica 20:680-684
9. Satterthwaite M (1975) Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. J Econ Theory 10:187-217
10. Slinko A (2002) On asymptotic strategy-proofness of classical social choice rules. Theor Decis 52:389-398