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Social Choice and Welfare
Volumn 25, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 173-178
The inverse plurality rule - An axiomatization
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EID: 29144441957     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-005-0048-0     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (25)
References (14)
  • 1
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    • Baharad, E.1    Nitzan, S.2
  • 2
    • 0011405421 scopus 로고
    • Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting
    • Baigent N, Xu Y (1991) Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting. Math Soc Sci 21:21-29
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    • Baigent, N.1    Xu, Y.2
  • 4
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    • Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
    • Fishburn PC (1978) Axioms for approval voting: direct proof. J Econ Theory 19:180-185
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    • Fishburn, P.C.1
  • 5
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    • Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
    • Huang HC, Chua CH (2000) Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition. Soc Choice Welf 17:143-155
    • (2000) Soc Choice Welf , vol.17 , pp. 143-155
    • Huang, H.C.1    Chua, Ch.2
  • 7
    • 0000948966 scopus 로고
    • The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
    • Lepelley D, Mbih B (1994) The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences. Soc Choice Welf 11:253-265
    • (1994) Soc Choice Welf , vol.11 , pp. 253-265
    • Lepelley, D.1    Mbih, B.2
  • 8
    • 0009958510 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Choix Social positionnel et principe majoritaire
    • Lepelley D, Merlin V (1998) Choix Social positionnel et principe majoritaire. Ann Écon Stat 51:29-48
    • (1998) Ann Écon Stat , vol.51 , pp. 29-48
    • Lepelley, D.1    Merlin, V.2
  • 9
    • 0036204378 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
    • Myerson RB (2002) Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games. J Econ Theory 103:219-251
    • (2002) J Econ Theory , vol.103 , pp. 219-251
    • Myerson, R.B.1
  • 10
    • 0003744755 scopus 로고
    • Ecole Polytechnique, Universite Paris IX-Dauphine
    • Moulin H (1986) The Strategy of Social Choice, Ecole Polytechnique, Universite Paris IX-Dauphine
    • (1986) The Strategy of Social Choice
    • Moulin, H.1
  • 12
    • 0036167653 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously
    • Sanver MR (2002) Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously. Math Soc Sci 43:151-155
    • (2002) Math Soc Sci , vol.43 , pp. 151-155
    • Sanver, M.R.1
  • 13
    • 0000476013 scopus 로고
    • A characterization result for the plurality rule
    • Richelson JT (1978) A characterization result for the plurality rule. J Econ Theory 19:548-550
    • (1978) J Econ Theory , vol.19 , pp. 548-550
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  • 14
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    • Social choice scoring functions
    • Young HP (1975) Social choice scoring functions. SIAM J Appl Math 28:824-838
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    • Young, H.P.1

* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.