Almost-dominant strategy implementation: Exchange economies

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 48, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 154-170

  Schummer, James ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

dominant; Almost dominant strategy; Strategy proofness

Indexed keywords

EID: 3142674238     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.08.002     Document Type: Article

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