Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 53, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 239-254

  Maus, Stefan ^a   Peters, Hans ^a   Storcken, Ton ^a  

^a MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Anonymity; Minimal manipulability; Social choice functions

Indexed keywords

EID: 34247504989     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.02.002     Document Type: Article

References (14)

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