Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 15, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 455-467

  Fristrup, Peter ^a   Keiding, Hans ^b  

^a Department of International Economics and Management   (Denmark)

^b UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 19544366284     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550050117     Document Type: Article

References (3)

1. Gibbard A (1973) Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result. Econometrica 41: 587-602
2. Kelly JS (1989) Interjacency. Soc Choice Welfare 6: 331-355
3. Satterthwaite M (1975) Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. J Econ Theory 10: 187-217