Equilibrium vengeance

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 66, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 813-829

  Friedman, Daniel ^a   Singh, Nirvikar ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Evolutionary perfect Bayesian equilibrium; Reciprocity; Social dilemmas; Vengeance

Indexed keywords

EID: 67349133671     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.10.006     Document Type: Article

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