Introduction to the evolution of preferences

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 97, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 225-230

  Samuelson, Larry ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035314842     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2753     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. K. Binmore, Nash Bargaining Theory, III, STICERD Discussion Paper 80/15, London School of Economics, 1980.
2. A. Bisin and T. Verdier, The economics of cultural transmission and the dynamics of preferences, J. Econ. Theory 97 (2001), 298-319.
3. V. P. Crawford and H. Varian, Distortion of preferences and the Nash theory of bargaining, Econ. Lett. 3 (1979), 203-206.
4. J. C. Ely and O. Yilankaya, Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences, J. Econ. Theory 97 (2001), 255-272.
5. R. H. Frank, If homo economicus could choose this own utility function, would he want one with a conscience? Amer. Econ. Rev. 77 (1987), 593-604.
6. R. H. Frank, "Passions within Reason," Norton, New York, 1988.
7. D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine, Maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed, Rev. Econ. Stud. 59 (1992), 561-579.
8. D. Fudenberg and E. Maskin, The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting and incomplete information, Econometrica 54 (1986), 533-554.
9. D. Gauthier, "Morals by Agreement," Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986.
10. J. R. Green, Commitments with third parties, Ann. Econ. Statist. 25/26 (1992), 101-121.
11. W. Güth, An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives, Int. J. Game Theory 24 (1995), 323-344.
12. W. Güth and M. E. Yaari, Explaining reciprocal behavior in simple strategic games: An evolutionary approach, in "Explaining Process and Change" (U. Witt, Ed.), pp. 23-34, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 1992.
13. E. Ok and F. Vega-Redondo, On the evolution of individualistic preferences: An incomplete information scenario, J. Econ. Theory 97 (2001), 231-254.
14. E. Ostrom, Collective action and the evolution of social norms, J. Econ. Perspectives 10, No. 3 (2000), 137-158.
15. A. T. Peacock, "The Theory of the Market Economy," Hodge, London, 1952.
16. A. J. Robson, Efficiency in evolutionary games: Darwin, Nash, and the secret hand-shake, J. Theoret. Biol. 144 (1990), 379-396.
17. L. Samuelson, Analogies, adaptation, and anomalies, J. Econ. Theory 97 (2001), 320-366.
18. T. Schelling, "The Strategy of Conflict," Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1980 [1st ed., 1960].
19. R. Sethi and E. Somanathan, Preference evolution and reciprocity, J. Econ. Theory 97 (2001), 273-297.
20. H. von Stackelberg, "Marktform und Gleichgewicht," Springer, Vienna, 1934.