Evolutionary Learning in Signalling Games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 34, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 34-63

  Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen ^a   Jensen, Mogens ^a   Sloth, Birgitte ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0010122826     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.2000.0795     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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