An options-based solution to the sequential auction problem

Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 173, Issue 7-8, 2009, Pages 876-899

  Juda, Adam I ^a   Parkes, David C ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Coordination problems; Dynamic auctions; Electronic markets; Options; Preferences; Proxy agents; Strategyproofness

Indexed keywords

COORDINATION REACTIONS; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; INTELLIGENT AGENTS;

COORDINATION PROBLEMS; ELECTRONIC MARKETS; OPTIONS; PREFERENCES; PROXY AGENTS; STRATEGYPROOFNESS;

SALES;

EID: 62549125393     PISSN: 00043702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2009.01.002     Document Type: Article

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