Exploring bidding strategies for market-based scheduling

Decision Support Systems

Volumn 39, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 67-85

  Reeves, Daniel M ^a   Wellman, Michael P ^a   MacKie Mason, Jeffrey K ^a   Osepayshvili, Anna ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Bidding strategies; Evolutionary game theory; Evolutionary search; Market based scheduling; Nash equilibrium; Replicator dynamics; Simultaneous ascending auctions

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; COMPUTER SIMULATION; GAME THEORY; PROBLEM SOLVING; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

BIDDING STRATEGIES; EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY; EVOLUTIONARY SEARCH; MARKET-BASED SCHEDULING; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; REPLICATOR DYNAMICS; SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING AUCTIONS;

SCHEDULING;

EID: 9544239350     PISSN: 01679236     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.dss.2004.08.014     Document Type: Conference Paper

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