Sequential auctions for the allocation of resources with complementarities

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 1, Issue , 1999, Pages 527-534

  Boutilier, Craig ^a   Goldszmidt, Moises ^b   Sabata, Bikash ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

^b SRI INTERNATIONAL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; COMBINATORIAL MODELS; DECISION PROBLEMS; DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING MODEL; MARKET-BASED MECHANISMS; SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS; SIMULTANEOUS AUCTIONS; SIMULTANEOUS MODEL;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

COMMERCE;

EID: 84880660522     PISSN: 10450823     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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