Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 132, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 335-366

  Mishra, Debasis ^a   Parkes, David C ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Combinatorial auctions; Multi item auctions; Primal dual algorithm; Universal competitive equilibrium; Vickrey auctions

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845564672     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.09.004     Document Type: Article

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