An algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 1, Issue , 1999, Pages 542-547

  Sandholm, Tuomas ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS; MULTI-ITEM; NP COMPLETE; SEARCH ALGORITHMS; SEARCH SPACES; SELECTIVE GENERATION; WINNER DETERMINATION;

ALGORITHMS; ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; OPTIMIZATION;

COMMERCE;

EID: 84880653860     PISSN: 10450823     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (12)

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