Virtual worlds: Fast and strategyproof auctions for dynamic resource allocation

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 238-239

  Ng, Chaki ^a   Parkes, David C ^a   Seltzer, Margo ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS; ECONOMICS; PROBLEM SOLVING; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

PROBLEM COMPLEXITY; VIRTUAL WORLDS;

VIRTUAL REALITY;

EID: 0242456196     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (4)

1. E. Friedman and D. C. Parkes. Pricing WiFi at Starbucks-Issues in Online Mechanism Design. In Proc. Fourth ACM Conf. on Elec. Commerce (EC'03), 2003. Extended version at http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/econcs/pubs/online.pdf.
2. D. Lehmann, L. I. O'Callaghan, and Y. Shoham. Truth Revelation in Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions. Journal of the ACM, 49(5):577-602, September 2002.
3. C. Ng, D. C. Parkes, and M. Seltzer. Strategyproof Computing: Systems Infrastructures for Self-Interested Parties. Technical report, Harvard University, 2003.
4. C. Ng, D. C. Parkes, and M. Seltzer. Virtual Worlds: Fast and Strategyproof Auctions for Dynamic Resource Allocation. In Fourth ACM Conf. on Elec. Commerce (EC'03), 2003. Extended version at http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/econcs/pubs/virtual.pdf.