Chain: A dynamic double auction framework for matching patient agents

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

Volumn 30, Issue , 2007, Pages 133-179

  Bredin, Jonathan ^a   Parkes, David C ^b   Duong, Quang ^b  

^a Department of Psychology   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; LEARNING SYSTEMS; PATIENT MONITORING;

AUCTION RULES; DYNAMIC DOUBLE AUCTION FRAMEWORKS; LEARNING AGENTS; MATCHING PATIENT AGENTS;

INTELLIGENT AGENTS;

EID: 38349111392     PISSN: None     EISSN: 10769757     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1613/jair.2303     Document Type: Article

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