Separable preferences, strategyproofness, and decomposability

Econometrica

Volumn 67, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 605-628

  Le Breton, Michel ^a   Sen, Arunava ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Decomposable; Product domains; Separable preferences; Social choice; Strategyproof

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001065553     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00038     Document Type: Article

References (13)

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