Compensation, turnover, and top management incentives: Historical evidence

Journal of Business

Volumn 70, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 153-187

  Hadlock, Charles J ^a   Lumer, Gerald B ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039647002     PISSN: 00219398     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/209714     Document Type: Article

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