An evolutionary game-theoretic comparison of two double-auction market designs

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 3435 LNAI, Issue , 2005, Pages 101-114

  Phelps, Steve ^a   Parsons, Simon ^b   McBurney, Peter ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL   (United Kingdom)

^b CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; GAME THEORY; HEURISTIC METHODS; INTELLIGENT AGENTS; MARKETING; PROBABILITY;

DOUBLE-AUCTION MARKET DESIGNS; GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS; HEURISTIC-STRATEGY APPROXIMATION; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 33744811192     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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