Empirical mechanism design: Methods, with application to a supply-chain scenario

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn 2006, Issue , 2006, Pages 306-315

  Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy ^a   Kiekintveld, Christopher ^a   Wellman, Michael P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Empirical Mechanism Design; Game Theory

Indexed keywords

DATA ACQUISITION; GAME THEORY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; NUMERICAL ANALYSIS; PARAMETER ESTIMATION;

EMPIRICAL MECHANISM DESIGN; PARAMETER SETTINGS; SUPPLY-CHAIN SCENARIO;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 33748678509     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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