Reducing price fluctuation in continuous double auctions through pricing policy and shout improvement

Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents

Volumn 2006, Issue , 2006, Pages 1143-1150

  Niu, Jinzhong ^a   Cai, Kai ^a   Parsons, Simon ^b   Sklar, Elizabeth ^b  

^a City College of New York   (United States)

^b CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

Continuous double auction; Pricing policy; Shout improvement rule

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; COST ACCOUNTING; INTELLIGENT AGENTS; LOGIC PROGRAMMING; PARAMETERIZATION;

CONTINUOUS DOUBLE AUCTIONS; PARAMETERIZED SPACE; PRICING POLICY; SHOUT IMPROVEMENT RULES;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 34247201595     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1160633.1160841     Document Type: Conference Paper

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