An algorithm for automatically designing deterministic mechanisms without payments

Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2004

Volumn 1, Issue , 2004, Pages 128-135

  Conitzer, Vincent ^a   Sandholm, Thomas ^a  

^a Carnegie Mellon University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AUTOMATED MECHANISM DESIGN (AMD); COMBINATORIAL AUCTION DESIGN; DETERMINISTIC MECHANISMS; RANDOMIZATION;

HEURISTIC METHODS; INTELLIGENT AGENTS; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; OPTIMIZATION; PROBLEM SOLVING; RESEARCH;

ALGORITHMS;

EID: 4544338902     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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