Some preliminary results on competition between markets for automated traders

AAAI Workshop - Technical Report

Volumn WS-07-13, Issue , 2007, Pages 19-26

  Niu, Jinzhong ^a   Cai, Kai ^a   Parsons, Simon ^b   Sklar, Elizabeth ^b  

^a City College of New York   (United States)

^b CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AGENT DESIGN; AGENT-BASED; MARKET SCENARIOS; STOCK EXCHANGES; TECHNICAL REPORTS; TRADING AGENTS;

AGENTS; COMMERCE; FINANCIAL DATA PROCESSING; OCCUPATIONAL RISKS; RISK ASSESSMENT;

MARKETING;

EID: 51849089128     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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