Automated Mechanism Design: Complexity Results Stemming from the Single-Agent Setting

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn 5, Issue , 2003, Pages 17-24

  Conitzer, Vincent ^a   Sandholm, Thomas ^a  

^a Carnegie Mellon University   (United States)

Author keywords

Automated Mechanism Design; Game Theory

Indexed keywords

AUTOMATION; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; INTERFACES (COMPUTER); LINEAR PROGRAMMING; MECHANIZATION; POLYNOMIALS; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS; PROBLEM SOLVING; RANDOM PROCESSES; THEOREM PROVING;

AUTOMATED MECHANISM DESIGN; MANIPULABILITY; SINGLE AGENT SETTING;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 1142292474     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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