One share - One vote: The theory

Review of Finance

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 1-49

  Burkart, Mike ^a   Lee, Samuel ^b  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 44849090024     PISSN: 15723097     EISSN: 1573692X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rof/rfm035     Document Type: Article

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