How relevant is dividend policy under low shareholder protection?

Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money

Volumn 64, Issue , 2020, Pages

  Renneboog, Luc ^a   Szilagyi, Peter G ^b  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY   (Hungary)

Author keywords

Anti shareholder provisions; Corporate governance; Dividend policy; Ownership and control

Indexed keywords

EID: 85078042243     PISSN: 10424431     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.intfin.2015.01.006     Document Type: Article

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