The entrepreneur's choice between private and public ownership

Journal of Finance

Volumn 61, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 803-836

  Boot, Arnoud W A ^a   Gopalan, Radhakrishnan ^b   Thakor, Anjan V ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^c WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST LOUIS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33644906648     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00855.x     Document Type: Article

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