Tender offers and leverage

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 119, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 1217-1248

  Müller, Holger M ^a,b   Panunzi, Fausto ^b,c  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Centre for Economic Policy Research   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 10444224669     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/0033553042476198     Document Type: Article

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