The expected number of Nash equilibria of a normal form game

Econometrica

Volumn 73, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 141-174

  Mclennan, Andrew ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

Algebraic geometry; Computational complexity; Nash equilibrium; Number of equilibria; Random games; Rotational invariance

Indexed keywords

EID: 27744581012     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00567.x     Document Type: Article

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