Algorithms for rationalizability and CURB sets

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 1, Issue , 2006, Pages 598-604

  Benisch, Michael ^a   Davis, George ^a   Sandholm, Tuomas ^a  

^a Carnegie Mellon University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CLOSED UNDER RATIONAL BEHAVIOR (CURB); CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; POLYNOMIAL ALGORITHMS;

COMPUTATION THEORY; GAME THEORY; ITERATIVE METHODS; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION; PROBLEM SOLVING; SET THEORY;

ALGORITHMS;

EID: 33750693387     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (22)

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