Computing sequential equilibria for two-player games

Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 107-110

  Miltersen, Peter Bro ^a   Sørensen, Troels Bjerre ^a  

^a AARHUS UNIVERSITY   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; LINEAR PROGRAMMING; POLYNOMIALS; PROBLEM SOLVING;

MINIMAX STRATEGIES; POLYNOMIAL-TIME; SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIA;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 33244480770     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1109557.1109570     Document Type: Conference Paper

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