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Games and Economic Behavior
Volumn 26, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 111-130
Generic 4 × 4 Two Person Games Have at Most 15 Nash Equilibria
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EID: 0042204039     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0640     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (21)
References (14)
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  • 5
    • 0031256798 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • On the Maximal Number of Nash Equilibria in a Bimatrix Game
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  • 6
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  • 7
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    • McLennan, A.1
  • 8
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    • Limiting Distributions of the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria
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  • 9
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    • A Theorem on the Number of Nash Equilibria in a Bimatrix Game
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  • 10
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.