Computing normal form perfect equilibria for extensive two-person games

Econometrica

Volumn 70, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 693-715

  Von Stengel, Bernhard ^a   Van Den Elzen, Antoon ^b   Talman, Dolf ^b  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Extensive game; Linear complementarity; Nash equilibrium; Normal form perfect equilibrium; Sequence form

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; VECTORS;

EXTENSIVE GAMES;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 0036212395     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00300     Document Type: Article

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