Lossless abstraction of imperfect information games

Journal of the ACM

Volumn 54, Issue 5, 2007, Pages

  Gilpin, Andrew ^a,b   Sandholm, Tuomas ^a,b  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Carnegie Mellon University   (United States)

Author keywords

Automated abstraction; Computer poker; Equilibrium finding; Game theory; Sequential games of imperfect information

Indexed keywords

AUTOMATED ABSTRACTION; COMPUTER POKER; EQUILIBRIUM FINDING; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; SEQUENTIAL GAMES OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION;

ABSTRACTING; APPROXIMATION THEORY; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; MATHEMATICAL TRANSFORMATIONS; SIGNAL SYSTEMS; TREES (MATHEMATICS);

GAME THEORY;

EID: 35348940239     PISSN: 00045411     EISSN: 1557735X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1145/1284320.1284324     Document Type: Article

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