Mechanisms of Democracy: Institutional Design Writ Small

Mechanisms of Democracy: Institutional Design Writ Small

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-272

  Vermeule, Adrian ^a  

^a HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

Constitutional law; Democratic theory; Institutional design; Institutional design writ small; Mechanisms of democracy; Transparent deliberation; Voting rules

Indexed keywords

EID: 41849124969     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195333466.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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