Legislator turnout and the calculus of voting: The determinants of abstention in the U.S. Congress

Public Choice

Volumn 103, Issue 3-4, 2000, Pages 259-270

  Rothenberg, Lawrence S ^a   Sanders, Mitchell S ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

^b FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034380515     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1005073328944     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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