Fiscal Transparency, Gubernatorial Approval, and the Scale of Government: Evidence from the States

State Politics and Policy Quarterly

Volumn 2, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 230-250

  Alt, James E ^a   Lassen, David Dreyer ^b   Skilling, David ^c  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

^c The Treasury   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037975080     PISSN: 15324400     EISSN: 19461607     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/153244000200200302     Document Type: Article

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