The tyranny of the supermajority: How majority rule protects minorities

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 53-77

  McGann, Anthony J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Democratic theory; Majority; Minority protection

Indexed keywords

EID: 1642458290     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951629804038902     Document Type: Review

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