Minority voting rights can maximize majority welfare

American Political Science Review

Volumn 93, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 85-97

  Chwe, Michael Suk Young ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0003119518     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2585762     Document Type: Article

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